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PETITION FOR REHEARING

POINT ONE. THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING A
VALID CONTRACT FOR SALE WAS MADE PRIOR TO THE
TIME THE OWNERS RESOLVED THEIR DIFFERENCES.
Ore basis for appellant's petition iu± ren^arj-.
a

4

> L misunderstanding concerning th<" effect

trial court1s February order and a fc
statements by the trial court consi dering the effect

-2said order.

This court stated:

" . . . In February 1974, the court approved their recommendation of the receiver and
directed him to proceed to accept the offer
made by F.M.C. Pursuant thereto, the receiver
entered into a contract with that company.
Although the receiver again moved the
court to approve the contract, he did not need
to do so in order to make a binding contract. . . .
Both F.M.C. and the receiver assumed that
a final approval was necessary. However, the
court had expressly directed the receiver to
enter into a contract with F.M.C. (Advance sheet
at page 3)
This court then concluded that after a contract of
sale has been made, the owners " . . . ought not be permitted to defeat the rights of the purchasers by jointly
asserting they have settled all differences." (Advance
sheet at page 4)
In reaching the foreoing conclusion, the court recognized that in connection with judicial sales, where a sale
is not regulated by statute, the trial court essentially
makes its own rules subject to the use of sound discretion.
Chapman vs. Schiller, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938).
This court also indicated a court may establish a procedure
requiring judicial confirmation offers made to a receiver
or may offer as a receiver to accept an offer on specific
terms and thus obviate the need for further judicial action.
Once however, a court has determined to follow a particular

-3procedure in making a judicial sale# it is obliged to
adhere to its self-imposed rules.
In finding that the trial court, by its February
order, had authorized the receiver to enter into a contract with the intervenor which was not subject to judicial
confirmation/ this court apparently overlooked the fact that
the trial court itself intended that; the contract was not to
binding until such took place.
This court failed to consider indications in the
record that the trial court itself stated in March (after
the order was entered) that by its February order the court
had merely approved an order to negotiate, and had not
approved any sale to intervenor. (R 310-311).

See also

Reply Brief of Appellants pages 15-22.
The trial court was charged with establishing a fair
and orderly procedure for the judicial sale.

Since the

trial court itself/ has indicated that no contract was
approved or authorized by the February action/ this court
erred in determining that a binding contract had in fact
been authorized.

This court's determination that a binding

contract was formed by the authority granted the receiver
in the February order is also undermined by the fact that
the trial court itself deemed it necessary to confirm and
approve the contract at a much later date.

Since the trial

4court was charged with formulating the procedure to be
employed in the judicial sale and because it itself indicated that a binding contract was not authorized by the
February order, the trial court's action cannot be upheld
on the basis that this court has utilized.

The trial court

must be required to adhere to the rules which it has itself
established.
The review of Equity proceedings is indicated in
Harding v.

Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277 488 P.2d 308, 310 (1971).

In Equity proceedings:
11

. . . It is the prerogative of the court to review the evidence, to make its own findings, and to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
when the ends of justice so require. However, due
to the prerogatives and advantage position of the
trial court, we pursue that broad authorization under certain rules of review which are now well established: its actions are indulged with the presumption
of validity and correctness and the burden is upon
the appellant to show a basis for upsetting them:
either (1) that findings have been made when the events
clearly preponderates the other way; or (2) there has
been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial prejudicial error; or (3)
that it appears plainly that there has been an abuse
of discretion or inequality or injustice has resulted.11
Regardless of which of the foregoing standards is ap»

plicable, since no contract was authorized by the February
order, the action of the trial court was clearly improper.
Because there was no contract, since the intervenor had
notice of the limited nature of its rights prior to

-5confirmation and because the trial court expressly directed
the owners to continue settlement negotiations, this court
should not have affirmed the trial court action, particularly
in light of the standard for review utilized in equity proceedings.
POINT TWO. THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THE CONTRACT PRESENTED TO THE COURT FOR FINAL
APPROVAL IN MAY, 1974 WAS THE SAME AS THE FEBRUARY
PROPOSAL.
In its opinion this court stated:
"The final agreement provided that the
attorneys would have to make certain certifications regarding title, etc. It was the
same agreement which had been approved by
the court on February 22, 1974, except for
the mechanics of how it would be implemented."
As indicated previously in this petition for rehearing,
it is appellant's position that the court did not authorize
an agreement by its February action as demonstrated by the
subsequent actions of the trial court itself.

In the event,

however, that this court is not persuaded to that effect as
a result of this petition for rehearing it should at a minimum take steps to protect the interests of the owners since
it is evident that the agreement submitted to the trial
court in June, 1974 contains many substantial changes from
the February proposal which are highly prejudicial to the
rights of the owners.

m

-6Even if, as this court determined, the owner's
differences were resolved too late to preclude the
intervenor from obtaining certain rights, the owners at
a minimum were entitled to a fair price for their interests
in accordance with the February proposal.

The agreement

approved by the trial court simply does not accord to the
owners this protection.
Appellants have previously made a detailed comparison
of the changes between the February proposal and the later
contract which demonstrate beyond question that the subsequent contract does not comport with the earlier February
proposal in numerous particulars that are unfair to the
owners.

This is demonstrated by the comparison of the

February proposal (R-141-144) with a completed contract
CR~189-259} as the major differences are highlighted by
the appellant's summary (R-387).

V

Particularly onerous is the $75f000.00 escrow provided
for in the completed contract but never mentioned or even
alluded to in the February proposal.

The escrow agent is

to hold the funds for up to two years after the closing
IR-390).

Since the closing will not take place until after

FCC approval, (a procedure which takes from four to six months),
the owners will be deprived of a significant portion of the

-7purchase price for an inordinate period of time.

The sale#

however, is structured in a manner most advantageous to the
intervenor.

The sale is structured in a manner that will

require the owners to immediately pay all appropriate taxes
on the entire gain realized from the transaction.

But because

of the onerous escrow agreement the owners will be hardpress-.
ed to pay these taxes and will be precluded from going into
any other business. Additionally/ all interest on investment
proceeds during the escrow period will be the property of the
intervenor.

Other of the burdensome and unfair changes are

apparent from a comparison of appellant's summary with the
proposal and contract.
This court's ruling requiring the owners to sell their
interest to intervenor was predicated upon the determination
that the owner's settlement had been reached after the intervenor had acquired rights in the radio station's assets
and it would not be fair to the intervenor to negate the
sale.

The owners, however, still must be deemed to have

some rights in the matter.

Permitting the sale to take place

in a manner imposing an unfair burden on the owners by precluding them from taking advantage of other business opportunities and forcing them to pay taxes on a sale before they
have actually realized a significant portion of the proceeds
is not in accordance with the February proposal. This

-8-

1

result was neither contemplated nor proposed in the

•

February documents.

I

It is unfair and unjust to impose this

result upon the owners simply because they have been found
to have not made a timely resolution of their outstanding

x-

differences*

•
I

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits the trial court established a procedure for

conducting the judicial sale which required

confirmation of the contract made by the receiver.

Having

I
*

established such a procedure, the trial court could not
later take action consistent with this procedure.

It is

not proper for this court to condone the trial court's dis-

I
i

regard of its own procedure*
Assuming the intervenor did require rights prior to the
time the owners settled their outstanding differences, such
rights were defined by the February proposal.

At a minimum, the owners are entitled

to a contract which fairly and consistently comports to the
February proposal.

j

The completed

contract contains onerous and unfair terms not included in
the February proposal.

|

Appellant submits that a rehearing of

this matter is justified on both grounds.
Respectfully submitted,
REED L. MARTINEAU and
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
700 Continental Bank Building
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